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GEORGE A. LOWE C011PANY, a
corporation, THE SALT L i\. K E
HARDWARE COMPANY, a corporation, and STREVELL PATERSON H.A.RDWARE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Petitioners,
vs.

,

Case No. 7283

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, D 0 N A L D HACKING,
Chairman, W. R. MciNTYRE and
OSCAR W. CARLSON, Commisstoners,
Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACT
The petitioners herein during the month of October,
1948 entered into an agreement the full text of which is set
forth in the petitioners' brief, whereby the petitioners jointly
rented a motor truck and hired a driver to transport merSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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chandise belonging to the petitioners to their customers
throughout the State of Utah. The petitioners seek this writ
on the grounds that if not restrained the Public Service Commission of Utah will interfere with the operation of this
business arrangement. Respondents have taken no exception
to the form of the action or the sufficiency of the pleadings
as it is the desire of the respondents to secure a judicial
determination of the question here involved in the n1ost expeditious manner.
It is the contention of the respondents that the operation
as carried on by the petitioners is contrary to the laws of
the State of Utah regulating contract motor carriers of property
for the reasons which will be hereafter more fully discussed.
The respondents will attempt to meet the arguments raised
by the petitioners in their brief and then will set forth affirmative arguments in favor of their position herein.

ARGUMENT
THE AGREEMENT HERE IN QlJESTION IS IN FACT
AND EFFECT A PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.
It is the position of the respondents herein that the agreement entered into by the petitioners is an agreement by the
petitioners to carry on a business of transporting goods and
merchandise over the. high\vays of the State of Utah and that
by virtue of _said agreement a new partnership entity comes
into being, which partnership entity is a contract motor
carrier of property as defined in Sec. 76-5-13 U.C.A., 1943.
As is stated by petitioners, Sec. 69-1-3, U.C.A., 1943
provides:
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,ttA partnership ·is an association of. two or more person~

to carry on as co-owners a business fo~ profit,..~~

Sec. 69-1-1 lT.C.A., 1943 defines the

\VO(d

per~o~1

as! us~d

in the chapter on partnership as follows: .
'~

'Person' includes individuals, partnerships, corpora~
tions and other associations."
The fact that the three petitioners are corporations in
themselves would have no effect upon whether. or not their
association in a business foreign and apart from the business
which they operate in their corporate capacity constitutes a
partnershtp.
Petitioners make several categorical statements regarding
the nature of their operation none of which appear to the
respondents to be supported by the facts of the, case. They
state first that the activity carried on pursuant to the agreement set forth in the petitioners brief is not a business. With
this statement he respondents cannot agree. The term "business"
is rather a loosely used term to describe any commercial activity.
Webster defines the term as:
"That which busies, or engages time, attention or
labor as a principal serious concern or interest."
The following definitions are found in the cases indicated:
" 'Business' in its broad sense is tl;le effort of men by
varied methods of' dealing with each 'other to 'improve
their individual ·economic conditions and satisfy their
desires." People ex rei Attorney General v. Jersin,
(Colo.) 74 Pac. 2nd 668 .
." 'Business' is a very comprehensive term and e~braces
everything about which a person· can be employed."
In re Booth, 18 Fed. Supp. 79.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
Certainly the activity carried on by the petitioners under
their contract appears. to be a business within the contemplation
of .the. partnership act
Th~ petitioners state furth~r that they are not the coowners of anything. With this statement also the respondents
take issue. It is not necessary that the partners own in common
any tangible property, or for that matter any intangible property other than the partnership business itself. For instance,
it is entirely conceivable that a legal partnership might exist
without the partners owning a book, a piece of office furniture
or everi the lease on an office provided that they were coowners of the legal business. This approach was taken by
the court in the case of Bentley v. Brossard, 33 Utah 396,
94 P 736, where the court stated:

"Furthetmore each party here had, not only an interest in carrying on the business or adventure, but
also a common ownership in the business itself."
However if the petitioners desire something other than
mere co-ownersh1p of the business as a basis for establishment
of a partnership it is called to the attention of the court that
in the case now being argued, the petitioners are co-owners
of leases on motor ;vehi>cles. No reason appears why the
owner of a lease-hold interest ~ould not be within the term
ownership just as .much as would be the owner of the residual
interest.
Further the petitioners state that this is not a business
carried. on for profit. Here also the respondents are forced
to take issue. It must be assumed that as a result of this
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working arrangement the petitioners are able to secure transportation for their merchandise at ·a lower . price than they
would have to pay other contract carriers. At .least it should ·
be assumed t~at that was the hope and desire with. which
they entered into the partnership arrangement. If such· is the
case and the petitioners were each to pay to the partnership
entity the regulady established price of other contract carriers,
a profit would result which would be available for distribution.
Rather than pay this higher amount and then distribute the
amount over and above costs back to the partners in the form
of profit, the petitioners choose to make the payment to
the partnership entity in an amount just sufficient to cover
actual operating expenses. By doing this they receive a
financial advantage just as real and in the same amount as
if there were a distribution of the residue of 1ncome over
and above expenses. Once again referring to Webster,
"profit" is defined as:
ccAquisition of good, useful consequence, benefit,
avail, gain."
The following definition of uprofit" is found in }Jundy
v. Van Hoose (Ga.) 30 SE 783:
ccProfit is the acquisition beyond expenditure; · exce~s
· 'of value received for producing, keeping or selling over
cost, hence pecuniary gain in any transaction. or· occupation.''
The fact that the petitioners may .not have intenc;led to
enter into a partnership arrangement .is not controlling if in.
fact the association formed is such as is in contemplation
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of the law, :is a ·partnership. · As was stated· ·by this court
in -the case .of: ·Bentley v.· Brossard; 33' U 396, 94 P 736: at
pag~742: . . ..
- '·
!: ,·'··I'

'Wlieri ··the triil ·court perrriltteel: the jury to determine· from all the evidence and· circumstances ·"Whether
the defendants had intended to assume the relation
of partnership towards each other, it also committed
error. True it is sometimes said that to constitute a
partnership the parties must have intended to create
such relation. . c But,' as was said by the court in the
case of Fleming v. Lay, 109 Fed. 952, 48 C.C.A. 748,
'by this it is meant to say they must have intended
to make such stipulations as in law constitute a partner. ship, and not that they intended the conclusion without regard to the conditions upon which it results
as matter of law.' And, as said by Mr. Lindley in
_l,lis work on partnership, 'if they have in fact stipulated
for all the rights of partners, an agreement that they
shall not be partners is a useless protest against the
consequences of their real agreement.' 1 Lindl. Partn.
(5th Ed.) 11) "
·c

See also in this connection Bridgman v. Winsness, 34 U
383, 98 Pac. 186.
Let us ask ourselves, if this is not a partnership, what
sort of an association is it? It is certainly more than a joint
venture. A joint venture :has,many of the· aspects· of a partnership. except that -it, is confined to one· or a limited number
of transactions.. . Here the association is- conducting for a
petiod of- time . a ·course of business. They are not limiting
~heir· business to one certain- haul or to any limited number
of hauls, but rather it is the intention to do as ,much hauling
during the life of the contract as the persons ·with whom the
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assoctatlon does business may desire. Furthermore, let us
ask ourselves who \Yould be responsible should .damage ·result
from the negligence of the driver of the truck during_ its
oper,ation. . Certainly there is sorneone. or some ,association
for whom the driver is agent .. It does not appear logical to
maintain that he is agent merely for the company whose goods
happen to be on the truck at the time such negligence occurs.
While it is true that the expense of the operation of the truck
including the salary of the driver is distributed between the
three petitioners every tvlo weeks according to the time spent
on the hauling for each individual member of the association,
it does not appear that the driver would become the employee
of the Salt Lake Hardware Co. when he was driving for
Salt Lake Hardvvare Co., of Strevell Paterson Hardware
Company when driving for Strevell Paterson and George A.
Lowe Company when driving for George A. Lowe Company.
The three companies do not make their payments in salary
directly to the driver as is shown by the petition. They are
billed every two weeks for their share of the expenses and
although there is a breakdown given in the billing, a total
figure is reached and checks are to be made · payable to H.
H. Ellsworth, supervisor of their operations. Evidently Ellsworth in turn pays the driver his salary. It is evident, ·therefore, that there is some entity existing between. the· petitioners
herein and the pe~sons who maintain and operate the .trucking
service. What . can this entity be if not a partnership? The
answer appears obvious that it is and must be a partnership
whether the parties .intend it to be or not, and. whether or
not there is a common partnership name.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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· Although there ·appears to· be· no tase in point directly
deciding the matter, the statutes of the State of Utah appear
to·' regard' a· partnership ·as an· :entity separate and apart from
the individual members thereof~· Sec. 104~3-26; Utah Code
Annotated 1943, :prdvides that a ··pa'rtnership may be sued
under a common name and that service of summons may be
had upon one of the partners for the entire partnership. Such
procedure is obviously inconsistent with the conception that
no partrtership entity exists.
THE PETITIONERS COME WITHIN THE DEFINITION
OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CONCERNING CONTRACT MOTOR CARRIERS.
Sec. 76-5-13 U.C.A., 1943 defines a contract motor carrier
of .prop~rty ~s ..follows:
Contract Motor Carrier of Property' means any
person engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle
of property· for hire and not included in the term
common motor carrier of property as hereinbefore
defined.'' ·
.tt

'

If the court agrees with the argument set forth in the
proc~edi11g 'sec~ibn · by respondents that the association of
tg~. petitjo~.ers: hc:r.eip. . cqnstitutes . a separate entity, the only
question; to be -·determined in deciding· whether or not the
op~ratioris' of the· petitioners partnership association comes
d~fi11ition set forth 'above is whether .or not the
within
op~~ation is c~rried ·-on for hire. · Certainly there can be little

the

question that compensation is paid to the partnership entity
oy· the individual members thereof for the services rendered.
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Attached to the petitiJn are copies of the statements submitted
to each of the individual members each two weeks by the supervisor of transportation. Certainly this is compensation, and
if in fact it is paid by the petitioners not to themselves. but
to a separate entity it cannot be questioned that the operation
is one for hire.
In the Florida case of Merchants Mutual Association Inc.
v. Mathews et al, 149 Southern 27, a nun1ber of companies
had formed a corporation for the purpose of carrying on a
transportation business to serve the stockholders under the
same sort of arrangement which is now before the court.
In deciding the question of whether or not the service can1e
within the defin1tion of carrying for hire, the Florida court
stated:
((The appellant is a corporation organized for the
express purpose of conducting the business of hauling
by use oi its motor trucks on the public highways of
Florida for con1pensation the good,s wares and merchandise of its stockholders only. Under its charter
it must haul for its stockholders at cost and without
profit. The pleadings admit that the corporation does
so contract with and so serve its stockholders. The
terms of the contract are mere incidents to the transaction of the business. By limiting its patronage to
its stockholders the corporation successfully eliminated
itself from the classification of common carrier, but
by the very terms of its charter and by ,its admitted contracts with its stockholders it brings itself within the
pervue of the statutes regulating private contract
. ''
earners.
In a subsequent case, State v. Karel, 180 So. 3., .the
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Florida Supreme Court decided -by· divided court ,that, the
same· ruling would not apply to an unincorporated association
be£ause of the fact that under the laws of the state of Florida
a>· partnership· was not· regarded:. as· having a;·legal entity;
however, it did not retreat from its position irt the earlier case.
In as ·much zs the Statutes of the State of Utah do appear
to- regard a partnership as an ent_ity separate and apart from
the members thereof, the reasoni~g of the Florida court in
the Merchants Mutual Association Inc. case is compelling
in this case. In the Montana case of the Christie Transfer
and Storage Company v. Match, 28 Pac. ( 2d) 470, the
Montana Supreme Court held that an unincorporated association hauling for· its members was not within the statutes, but
here· again the court reached its position on the ground that
there ·was no such thing as a partnership entity and that the
members of the association were merely hauling for themselves. However; if- the position is taken as our statutes seem
to· require· that the partnership entity be regarded as a thing
separate and apart from the individual members thereof, the
logic of the Montana case has no application whatsoever.
THE PROPOSED ACTION OF THE COMMISSION DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONS OF . THE
.UNITED STATES OR OF THE STATE OF UTAH .
. "t:

'

~~-~·r~~·:

_J

/ '

"\""·~ :-~·~t

1

'

1

t

'.i

.1

,

The .q~es.tlon_ of whether or .-~o_t the ~t~empt of the Public Service:. ¢omrhission to -~eg~l~te the·. ~perations of the
petitioners- meets with a .constitutional objection of course
depends ·upen whether or not we are in fact concerned with
a matter of hauling- for hire. At one time the courts leaned
-1

•

•

•

'

.

'
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to the view that public regulatory bodies could regulate the
activities only of common carriers. However, it soon became
evident that in order to protect comn1on carriers it was necessary that some regulations be exercised over those engaged
in business as contract carriers for hire.
In the case of Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, the Supreme
Court of the lTnited States upheld the power of statutes
regulating the operations of private contract carriers. The
term private contract carrier has been defined in a number
of cases, see Ace High Dress Co. v. J. C. Trucking Co. (Conn.)
191 Atlantic 536; Koppers Conn. Coke Co. v. James McWilliams Blue Line 18 Fed. Supp 992; First National Stores
v. H. P. Welch C o.(Mass.) 55 N. E. 2nd 200. Here again
the question of whethe.r or not the petitioners' association
falls within the accepted definitions of contract motor carriers
depends upon whether or not a partnership entity is recognized
as separate and apart from the individual members thereof.
If it is so recognized, then clearly v1e have a contract motor
carrier for hire, the regulation of which is prescribed by the
statutes and permitted by the constitution. If there is no contract carriage for hire, then the statutes do not prescribe the
regulation and so we are involved with no constitutional
question.
THE LEASE OF THE VEHICLE TO PETITIONERS CONSTITUTES THE OWNER OF SUCH \'EHICLE A
CONRACT MOTOR CARRIER FOR HIRE.
A matter which has not been considered by petitioners
in their brief or in their petition but which is very material
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in this~. case is the status of the .owner of the motor vehicles
which are leased by the petitioners .. This so called lease
arrangement is a device which has been attempted in this
state by a' number' of operators irl' an attempt .to ·contravene
the s·tatutes of the State rega.rding 'contract motor "carriers.
It. is the position of the Commission than an individual that
leases a motor vehicle for compensation to another individual
~o be used by that individual for hauling property upon the
highways of the State of Utah is a contract motor carrier for
hire and comes under the regulations of the statute. To hold
other wise would· be to permit subterfuge which would invalidate the Contract motor carrier regulations.
In the case of Cove v. The District of Columbia, 90 Fed.
2nd 383, the court held that a person engaged in the business
of renting funeral cars for persons desiring to use the same
was a contract motor carrier for hire even though full control
of ~he operation. of the vehicle was under the person hiring
the same.
In the case of State ex Rel Anderson v. Williston (Missouri) 102 So. W 2nd 199, a similar ruling was made in regard
to one who chartered buses. The fact that in the case now
before. the . ·court the 'lessee paid the gas and · oil and other
operating expenses of the truck in addition to the lease charge
offers no distinction. The· owner of the motor vehicle is
making available upon the payment of compensation a truck
to be: used for transporting goods over and .across the highways of the -State of. Utah~ and as such is a contract motor
carrier for hire. In order to prevent a violation of the law
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by this subterfuge the commissioner would take action against
both the lessor and lessee of the vehicle.
The court should look to the actual result obtained
rather than to the form in determining whether or not the
lessor of this equipment is actually operating as a contract motor
carrier for hire. In the case of Denver & Rio Grande Western
R. R. Co. v. Linc.k, 56 Fed. 2nd 957, the court stated:
((A person cannot by the execution of a contract
change the character of his operation from those of
a common carrier to those of a private carrier.·'
Likewise by the execution of a lease a person should not
be permitted to change the character of his operation from that
of a contract motor carrier to that of a lessee.
In the case of Tilton v. Model Taxi Corp., 23 Fed. Supp.
585, the court stated:
"The fact that the owners rented the vehicle is inconsequential, the important thing is how they conduct
the business, not that they name it.''
CONCLUSION
Although the number of individuals involved in the case
now before the court is small, this method of operation if
given judicial approval would result in a complete breakdown
of the ·regulation of contract motor carriers by the Public
Service Commission. There are many unincorporated associations in the State of Utah having hundreds or even thousands
of members. If these associations were permitted to make
motor transport service available to their members without
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regulation by the commission it is obvious that the regulation
of contract motor carriers would be at an end. Common
motor carriers of property would be subject to competition
which would be ruinous and prevent them from rendering
their necessary public service. The court should not permit
this type of violation to get its head into the tent. The petition
for a Writ of Probation should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
CALVIN L. RAMPTON,

Attorney for Respondents
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